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What are the roots of party identification?  Credit (or blame) often falls to parents, who 
have been shown to play a central role in development of partisan identification in 
adolescence.  Usually in these models of parental transmission of partisanship, children are 
seen as unquestioning recipients of partisan messages.  I consider whether this is so, 
investigating whether differences in young people’s levels of political interest, attention, and 
engagement also direct the development of partisan identity.  Second, I consider the effects of 
factors beyond the household in shaping partisanship – specifically the effects of differences in 
state level political contexts during a midterm campaign season.  I find that both the political 
personality of adolescents and their wider political environment contribute to the development 
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Political Context and the Development of Party Identification in Adolescence 
 
Partisanship is a powerful influence on people’s perceptions of politics – informing 
candidate choice, serving as a decision heuristic, and biasing how new political information is 
interpreted (Campbell et al. 1960; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Rahn 1993; Taber and Lodge 2006).  
The centrality of partisanship to electoral politics has lead many to wonder about the roots of 
partisan preferences – where they come from and how they develop.  According to The 
American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960), the origins of partisanship can be found in childhood 
and within the household, where parents play an important role in the development of their 
children’s partisan identities.  Even decades later, surveys confirm the importance of parents 
in shaping the partisan orientations of their offspring.  As noted in The American Voter 
Revisited (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008), when parents share the same party affiliation, they pass it 
to their children about 75% of the time.  And even as recent studies attribute parental 
influence to genetic causes, partisanship still emerges as primarily a socialized belief – one 
learned from parents and childhood experiences (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005).    
The relationship between the partisanship of parents and children is strong – stronger 
than parental influence on other political beliefs of offspring, such as policy preferences or 
trust (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2001).  Even so, parental transmission remains imperfect.  
Not all children mirror their parents’ partisanship, and arguably factors outside of the 
household can direct the trajectory of adolescents’ partisan development.  In this paper, I 
consider the mechanisms by which adolescents adopt or fail to adopt partisan identities.  In 
previous research, scholars have investigated how family characteristics or political eras 
condition the adoption of partisan identity (e.g. Beck and Jennings 1991; Jennings and Niemi 
1974; Luskin, McIver, and Carmines 1989).  I elaborate on this research by considering two 
other kinds of influences on youth partisanship – contextual factors beyond the family and the 
political dispositions of adolescents.    Why do young people change their party identification 
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over the course of a campaign?  To what degree is this a reflection of the distinctive political 
environment one finds himself in, and to what degree do changes in partisan identity reflect a 
young person’s orientation toward politics and desire to engage in political matters? 
There are a number of reasons to study the partisan preferences of adolescents.  One is 
to better understand the roots of a preference so central to politics.  Partisanship holds a 
distinctive place among the array of attitudes and dispositions people hold about politics.  
While opinions about policy issues are often marked by instability and variability, one’s party 
identification tends to be much more stable over time (Converse and Markus 1979).  While 
some fail to meaningfully identify with an ideology, most are willing and able to place 
themselves along a partisan spectrum.  And partisanship remains one of the best predictors of 
how people evaluate electoral politics – both a half century ago and today.  In 1952, 90% of 
strong partisans voted for their party in the presidential race, and nearly 75% of weak 
partisans did the same (Campbell et al. 1960).  Over fifty years later, the effects of 
partisanship on presidential vote choice remain robust.  In 2004, 97% of strong partisans voted 
for the candidate from their political party, as did about 88% of weak partisans (Lewis-Beck et 
al. 2008).   
Given that partisanship tends to become more stable over one’s lifetime (Jennings and 
Markus 1984; Sears and Funk 1999), adolescence marks a time in life where partisan 
preferences are particularly malleable.  The development of partisanship in adolescence thus 
has lifelong influence on how people see the political world.  In addition, the malleability of 
youth preferences also means that younger voters may disproportionately drive changes in 
macro level sentiment (Franklin 2004; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).  Thus how 
young people adapt their attitudes and behaviors in light of contemporary events can be 
consequential in explaining macro level partisan dynamics (Erikson, MacKuen, Stimson 2002). 
The adoption of partisanship also affects how adolescents relate to the political world 
in the short term and the long term.  Given that young people are less likely to turnout for 
 4
elections, it is useful to know how adolescents develop their early orientations toward politics.  
Partisan identities are connected to other civic attitudes – where identifying with a political 
party is correlated with political knowledge and participation in political discussion among 
high school students (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003).  Young people who do not establish 
early identification with a political party have more instability in political preferences over 
their lifetime (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2001).   
I begin by reviewing what prior research tells us about the roots of partisanship in 
adolescence.  I then develop why political geography should shape partisan development, and 
elaborate on why an adolescent’s political traits and dispositions could influence the adoption 
of a partisan identity.  Next, I examine the effects of political and social environments for 
partisan change among high school seniors across the course of a midterm election season.  I 
consider how much change takes place over the campaign season, and then model partisan 
change as a function of the campaign context, local social environments, and student 
dispositions.   
 
The Roots of Partisan Preferences 
In thinking about how political orientations develop in children, attention has focused 
on those influences that are closest to home.  Among the various socializing influences that 
young people encounter, parents are usually seen as the most powerful influence on adolescent 
partisanship (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 1981).  Family environments shape partisan 
identifications through both time and trust.  People spend a good bit of time with family 
members, creating opportunities for political messages to be distilled.  And while people may 
be skeptical about political accounts from the media or politicians, family members are often 
trusted and respected sources when conveying political information (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and 
Fitzgerald 2007). Peers turn out to be less influential on shaping the partisanship of young 
people, arguably because politics is less important among peer groups, and because 
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adolescents may not know the political preferences of their peers (Tedin 1980).  And while 
school environments can influence students’ civic dispositions (Campbell 2007; Zukin et al. 
2006), teachers do not direct the development of partisan identification (Jennings and Niemi 
1974).   
Beyond one’s immediate social context, the views of adolescents are also affected by the 
events of the day, and the nature of times and the era in which one grows up.  Growing up in 
politically contentious times shapes one’s later political trajectory (Jennings 2002).  Some 
political eras are more conducive to the parental transmission of partisanship than others, 
based on the nature of partisan cues provided by the political environment (Carmines, McIver, 
and Stimson 1987).  Political events like campaigns also have the ability to direct the 
development of partisan identities.  Sears and Valentino (1997) show that over the course of a 
presidential campaign, young people increased their levels of partisan affect and knowledge, 
and their levels of partisan strength increased to levels nearly as high as seen in a sample of 
adults.  Events like Watergate and the September 11 terrorist attacks also can influence the 
development of political attitudes among young people (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003; 
Hawkins, Pingrey, and Roberts 1975). 
These studies show the potential for influences outside the home to direct the 
development of partisanship among adolescents.  Their focus is on variations across time.  
However, political circumstances vary not only across eras, but also across space.  Some grow 
up in politically homogeneous areas, while others face greater political diversity.  Regions vary 
in the number and kind of political messages as well as the demographic diversity that is 
present.  States have distinct partisan cultures that demographics alone cannot explain 
(Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987).  Arguably these kinds of differences in social and political 
environments will shape how young people relate to political parties.  However, less is known 
about the consequences of geography in the socialization process.  In recent years, researchers 
have begun to pay more attention to the effects of larger social environments for the adoption 
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of civic attitudes like volunteerism and political knowledge.  Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 
(2003) find that political diversity and partisan competition are correlated with greater 
political knowledge and efficacy.  Political heterogeneity also promotes tolerance and political 
participation, while community homogeneity tends to be more conducive to civic engagement 
and social capital (Campbell 2006).  Growing up in areas with greater local electoral 
competition also correlates with voter turnout later in life (Pancheco 2008).    
 
The Effects of the Political Environment 
How do partisan identities develop during adolescence?  While parents play a central 
role in shaping the partisan socialization of youth, knowledge of parental partisanship is an 
imperfect predictor of the partisanship of adolescents (Jennings and Niemi 1974).  One reason 
why adolescents develop or fail to develop a particular partisan identity relates to their level of 
exposure to political information.  I argue that the greater the intensity of political signals 
from one’s surroundings, the greater the chance of partisan variability.  We know from prior 
research that such a relationship holds true within the family environment – where the 
success of parental transmission of partisanship depends in part on the presence or absence of 
clear partisan cues.  When parents are politically active and often talk about politics in the 
home, parental partisanship is more likely to be transferred to the child (Beck and Jennings 
1991; Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2001).  When parents fail to share 
the same partisanship, likelihood of transmission of partisan identification to children declines 
(Jennings and Niemi 1974).   
I investigate whether such a relationship holds true outside of the household, and the 
consequences of the quantity of political information available in one’s social context and the 
broader political environment.  If politicized families are better able to shape the partisanship 
of offspring than less politically active families, the same should hold for other political 
contexts.  Schools that provide more civic education and encourage political discussion provide 
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avenues to learn about contemporary politics and current events.  When people fall into peer 
groups of friends who like to chat about campaigns and politics, they should be more likely to 
encounter the kinds of information that direct the development of partisan identities.  Young 
people who pay more attention to the news will be exposed to more political arguments and 
policy positions.  And living in a state with competitive campaigns being waged also creates 
opportunities to encounter new partisan claims – through bumper stickers, news coverage, 
and television advertising.  When people are sheltered from current events in apolitical homes 
in states with low intensity campaigns, the opportunities to encounter the kinds of information 
that could induce partisan change are scarce.1   
Apart from the quantity of political messages one is exposed to, individuals also vary in 
their desire and willingness to engage with this information.  There is a tendency in studies of 
political socialization to see adolescents as passive recipients of political messages.  But it is 
likely that some children better receive the subtle political lessons that parents provide than 
others.  Indeed, recent research highlights that children are often active participants in 
shaping the political environment at home – where children can serve as instigators of 
political involvement, inspiring parents to become more politically engaged (McDevitt and 
Chaffee 2002).   
I argue that partisan development over the course of a campaign season rests in part 
on one’s political personality.  Some are more interested in politics, and more likely to pursue 
available political information.  People also vary in their need for cognition, and their desire to 
engage with political puzzles.  Others vary in their desire or tolerance of conflict.  Despite a 
popular expectation of rebellion as a traditional characteristic of adolescence, evidence of this 
                                                  
1 It is also possible that the socializing effects of the political context are a product of not just the number 
of political messages, but also their kind.  It may be that the conflict of competing partisan messages 
generates instable partisanship among young people.  We know from earlier research that the conflict 
between issue preferences and partisan identity can influence whether young people adopt a particular 
partisan identity or not (Jennings and Niemi 1974; Luskin, McIver, and Carmines 1989; Niemi and 
Jennings 1991).  I hope to explore the effects of diverse environments on partisan socialization in future 
research  
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in the inheritance of political attitudes has generally been scant (Jennings and Niemi 1968).  
But apart from rebellion for rebellion’s sake, young people likely vary in their desire and 
willingness to challenge their parents and other political information they encounter.  Some 
are conflict avoidant, wishing to avoid contentious political discussion.  Others are conflict-
seeking, willing to challenge parents about matters like candidate preferences and public 
policy matters.  These dispositions will influence how adolescents approach politics, in a way 
potentially consequential for the development of partisan identity.  As such, I consider how the 
attributes of adolescents themselves relate to partisan development.   
  
Data 
 To explore these effects of information environments on adolescent partisan 
identification, I rely on a panel survey of high-school seniors conducted in 2006.  The first 
wave of the survey was conducted in late summer of 2006, generally before the start of classes.  
The second wave took place in November and December 2006, after the midterm elections.  
Student survey respondents were drawn from ten states with state level races in 2006.  One 
state had a Senate race (Washington), three states had a gubernatorial race (Arkansas, 
Colorado, and Iowa), and six states had gubernatorial and senatorial races on the ballot 
(California, Florida, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island).2  Ninety-five students 
were randomly selected from each state, leading to an overall sample of 950 in the first wave.  
Of these participants, 570 also completed the second wave of the survey.3    
                                                  
2 For sake of comparison, in the 2006 American National Election Study, 56% of the sample resided in 
states with a gubernatorial and Senate race, 19% saw only a gubernatorial contest, 22% saw only a 
Senate race, and 3% lived in a state with no major state level contest. 
3 Considering the composition of the sample across the two waves, the size of each state sample in the 
second wave remains consistent across states.  Also, there were no significant differences in prior 
partisanship among those who complete only the pre-election survey versus those who complete both 
waves.   
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As others have shown (Sears and Valentino 1997), campaigns have the ability to shape 
the partisan attitudes of young people.4  Yet it is less clear whether these effects are unique to 
presidential campaigns, the races that draw the greatest attention and greatest participation 
from voters.  It may also be that the presence of a campaign matters more than its content or 
intensity.  Exploring differences in campaign environments across states during a midterm 
election season thus allows for a finer-grained test of the extent of campaign influence in 
partisan socialization.    
 To assess levels of partisan identification, respondents were asked, “Which of the 
following best represents your beliefs in terms of a political party or a political stance?  Green 
Party, Libertarian, Democrat, Republican, some other political stance, or would you say that 
you are not really political?”  In the first wave of the survey, 24% identified as Democrats, 23% 
identified as Republicans, 16% identified with another party or stance, and 37% replied that 
they were not political.  So among these high school seniors, less than half identified with one 
of the two major parties.  Given the unique question wording, it is difficult to know how this 
would compare to an adult sample.  However, the level of minor party identification among 
adolescents appears high, and major party affiliation appears a bit low.  This may be a 
reflection of an undeveloped sense of partisanship, or perhaps a reflection of openness to 
different party alternatives as a young person explores which party best suits their interests.    
 Next, I consider how partisan identification differed after the midterm elections.  Pre-
election partisanship and post-election identification are summarized in Table 1.  
Interestingly, the overall level of partisan identification in the sample did not increase after 
the election.  In the pre-election wave, 63% identified with any party.  In the post-election 
wave, the same share named a partisan affiliation.  Thus midterm campaigns did not 
systematically boost partisan identification across all respondents and all states.   
                                                  
4 We also see instable partisanship among an adult sample across the course of a presidential campaign 
(Brody and Rothenberg 1988; Allsop and Weisberg 1988). 
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However, there is a good bit of individual variation in partisan identification within the 
sample.  Considering changes in party identification between the pre-election survey and the 
post-election survey, 64% maintained the same identification across both waves.  Among the 
36% changing identification, one third shifted from holding a partisan identification to 
selecting none and the remaining two-thirds switched party identification to one they did not 
hold at the beginning of the election.  In other words, about a third of the sample changed 
their identification over the course of the campaign season, and these changes tended to be 
toward identifying with a different party rather than choosing to affiliate with no party.  
Considering who was most likely to shift partisanship, those who had initially identified with 
a minor party were the most likely to change, where only a third maintained the same 
identification.  For Democrats and Republicans, close to three quarters maintained the same 
partisanship across survey waves. 
What about the strength of partisan preferences among those who identified with a 
party?  Considering the subsample that maintained a consistent identification with a specific 
party across both panel waves (40% of the sample), no clear pattern of change in partisan 
strength emerged over the course of the campaign.  On a ten point scale of strength of party 
identification, 30% developed a stronger identification with their party over the course of the 
campaign, 37% stated a weaker identification in the post-election survey, and 33% maintained 
the same strength of identification across both surveys.   
Overall, the partisanship of adolescents over the course of a midterm election season is 
neither perfectly stable nor perfectly volatile.  It is not the case that this sample of high school 
seniors became uniformly more partisan in identification and strength of identification as a 
consequence of the gubernatorial and senatorial races being waged in their states.  But nor is 
it the case that these students remain constant in the face of these campaign environments – 
many maintained a consistent partisan identification across the campaign, but a good share 
changed affiliations over these months.   
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Explaining changes in youth partisanship across campaign seasons 
 Next, I explore why some maintain the same partisanship, while others change – and 
for those who change, why they choose to identify with another party or become apolitical.  Is 
partisan change largely idiosyncratic among these high school seniors, or can changes in 
identification be traced to features of the political environment?  To model the dynamics of 
partisan identification among high school seniors across a campaign season, I rely on two 
measures.  The first is a dummy variable considering stability versus change – where those 
who answer the partisan identification questions differently in the pre-election and the post-
election survey are coded 1, and the rest are coded 0.  In a second measure, I consider whether 
the change over the course of the campaign was to change affiliation or to move from 
identifying with a party in the first wave to selecting no party in the second wave.5   
  Among state level factors, I consider the effects of state-level campaign intensity.  I 
include measures of candidate spending in Senate and gubernatorial races.  To capture party 
activity beyond candidate campaign efforts, I also include a measure of national party 
transfers to the states (Holbrook and McClurg 2005).  Each is transformed to a measure 
comparable by states by taking the natural log of spending divided by state voting age 
population.  I expect that greater state campaign intensity will be correlated with greater 
partisan change, particularly in the direction of developing a partisan identity.   
 I also consider exposure to politics in the family, in school, in religious venues, and 
from the media.  Because levels of interpersonal discussion have been identified as 
particularly important in partisan socialization in prior studies (McDevitt 2006; Valentino and 
Sears 1998), I use measures of political talk to assess the quantity of political information 
                                                  
5 The choice of these measures is both empirical and theoretical.  In practical terms, a relatively small 
number of respondents are changing from one particular cell to other – combining into these categories 
boosts sample size in each.  Theoretically, such an approach is consistent with other research that 
argues that partisan switching is uncommon, where partisan change is less about choosing between 
Party A and Party B, and more about the decision to affiliate with one party or no party at all 
(Carmines, McIver, and Stimson 1987; Sears and Funk 1999; Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald 2007). 
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shared in different social milieus.  In the case of family discussion and conversations with 
friends, I rely on questions that ask about how often one discussed politics with family and 
friends.  For political talk in schools and churches, I rely on items that ask respondents to 
report how much political conversation took place in each.  To measure exposure to the news 
media, I use a question about levels of attention to political news.  Full question wordings for 
all items can be found in the Appendix.  I expect that greater political conversation will be 
affiliated with greater likelihood of partisan change across panel waves.   
 I also consider the consequences of adolescents’ propensity to seek or avoid political 
information.  One’s level of political interest is included, as well as a measure of how much one 
cognitively engages with stories encountered in the news.  Respondents are also asked a set of 
questions about how frequently they provoke their parents with political views, combined as a 
measuring of conflict seeking.  As a measure of conflict avoidance, I include a measure of 
whether one dislikes discussions about politics.  I expect interest and cognitive engagement to 
be positively related to partisan change, particularly in the direction of gaining a partisan 
identification.  In the case of conflict avoidance, I expect that those who dislike conflict to be 
more likely to shift partisanship over the course of the campaign, but in the direction of 
becoming less political and partisan.    
 Given that the models include both state level and individual level explanations for 
partisan change, I use a multilevel modeling strategy.  To model change in partisanship across 
panel waves, I use a multilevel logit model.  To distinguish whether one changes partisanship 
or becomes less political across panel waves, I use a multilevel multinomial logit model.  
Measures of campaign intensity, political talk, and individual dispositions are included as 
discussed above.  For measures of political talk, I include both the baseline level as well as 
change in the level of conversation (when available) to see whether the effects are primarily 
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due to the nature of the social environment or changes in political talk across the waves of the 
survey.6  Results are shown in Table 2. 
 Considering first the effects of campaign intensity, neither levels of gubernatorial 
campaign spending nor senatorial spending are significantly related to the likelihood of 
partisan change in the multilevel logit model.  In the multinomial logit model, however, 
Senate campaign spending is negatively associated with the probability of becoming less 
political over the course of the campaign season.  Gubernatorial campaign spending is also 
negatively related to the probability of becoming less political.  While campaign spending does 
not increase the likelihood of switching partisan affiliation over the campaign among these 
high school seniors, greater campaign intensity appears to inhibit the chances of becoming less 
political.  Party activity, as assessed with the national party transfers measure, is significantly 
related to a greater likelihood of partisan change across the campaign season, and surprisingly 
positively associated with the probability of becoming less political after the campaign.  
Overall, while campaign environments do not exert an overwhelming influence on partisan 
socialization, they do have modest influence in promoting partisan identification among youth. 
 To what degree do adolescents vary in their likelihood to change partisanship across 
the campaign?  I find that partisan change depends in part on adolescents’ level of political 
interest and engagement with the news. Those with greater interest in politics are more likely 
to hold stable partisanship across the course of the campaign.  In the multilevel multinomial 
logit model, political interest is negatively associated with both moving from a partisan 
identity to none, and moving to a different partisan identity.  While interest in politics 
decreases the likelihood of partisan change, cognitive engagement with political news is 
                                                  
6 Arguably, levels of political talk might also vary depending on state campaign intensity.  However, 
levels of campaign spending in this sample fail to predict the amount of political conversation in schools, 
families, peer groups, and churches, with one exception.  Levels of Senate spending are significantly 
related with higher reports of political conversations in schools.  Considering the correlations between 
the level-2 spending measures and other level-1 variables, no correlation is greater than 0.1.  On the 
whole, it does not appear that level of political talk is a reflection of the local intensity of campaigns.   
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positively associated with partisan change.  Those who like figuring out political news are 
more likely to demonstrate volatility in their identification.  It may be that political interest 
operates here in the manner of motivated reasoning (Taber and Lodge 2006), where these 
adolescents have already started to develop habits of selective interpretation – such that their 
news seeking tends to favor confirmatory evidence.  But for those who have a disposition to 
engage in more effortful processing, like those of higher cognitive engagement with the news, 
political attentiveness comes with greater openness to both sides. 
Not all enjoy political conflict, and I find that those who do not are less likely to change 
their partisanship over the course of the campaign.  In particular, in the multinomial logit 
model, conflict avoidance is negatively associated with changing partisan identification across 
the campaign.  In addition to liking or disliking political conflict, adolescents also vary in their 
desire to challenge and provoke their parents about current events.  Those who do are slightly 
more likely to change partisan identities over the campaign, but the effect is only weakly 
significant (p<0.09) and only in the multilevel logit model.  Students’ feelings about political 
conflict and disagreement arguably shape how they approach the political environment, in 
ways that are consequential for the adoption of partisan identification. 
Finally, I consider the effects of local political context for the development of adolescent 
party identification during a midterm campaign season.  First, I find that students’ levels of 
media attention prior to the campaign are positively associated with changing partisan 
identities over the course of the campaign, while increases in attention across these months is 
negatively associated with disaffiliation with a party over the campaign.  Levels of attention to 
the news are connected to the volatility of youth partisanship.  Turning next to the influence of 
home environments, higher levels of political discussion with parents also decrease the 
likelihood of becoming less political across the duration of the campaign.  Increasing levels of 
political talk with parents over the course of the campaign is positively associated with change 
in one’s partisan identity.  This second result is a bit surprising – as parents are usually seen 
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as agents of reinforcement.  However, if this change in political talk is initiated not by parents, 
but by the child (McDevitt 2006), this volatility may reflect an adolescent’s increasing 
awareness and consideration of the political sphere.   
Political conversations with peers have no effect on partisan change among adolescents 
– baseline levels of talk have no significant relationship, nor do changes in the level of talk 
across the campaign.  The findings of limited peer influence on youth partisanship in studies 
from the 1960s (Jennings and Niemi 1974) appear to hold today as well.  Greater political 
conversations in school, however, do promote partisan change, particularly in the direction of 
gaining a new partisan identity during the course of the campaign.  Over the years, schools 
have invested more in civic education through programs like Kids Voting, and politicized 
school environments like these appear consequential for the development of adolescent 
partisanship.  Finally, levels of political talk in one’s church or synagogue tends not to have an 
effect on partisan change over the campaign, though greater talk has a weak negative effect on 
the probability of becoming nonpolitical during the campaign.   
 
Discussion 
 More work needs to be done on investing the individual and contextual roots of 
partisanship for adolescents.  In future research, I plan to consider the effects of not only the 
amount of political information, but also the kind.  Arguably, the effects of political 
predispositions like conflict avoidance matter not only directly, but also in conjunction with 
the nature of the political environment.  Investigating the moderating effects of individual 
traits on the effects of state political contexts will be an important next step. 
 Several interesting findings emerge from this preliminary study.  First, I provide 
additional evidence that campaigns are socializing events for young people.  As Sears and 
Valentino (1997) note, socialization is not necessarily steady and incremental, but comes in fits 
and starts.  Midterm elections may also serve as one of these kinds of socializing events.  
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Midterm races and state level election contests tend not to draw as much public attention, 
interest, and participation as a presidential race – and overall, the general patterns of 
partisan change observed here suggests that the level of transformation of young people’s 
attitudes is not as great as has been observed in presidential election seasons (Sears and 
Valentino 1997).  Nonetheless, these state races have some influence on the partisan 
development of young people – in particular, decreasing the likelihood of becoming less 
political during the course of the campaign.   
Others have investigated the degree of partisan variability among adult samples 
during campaign seasons (Allsop and Weisberg 1988; Brody and Rothenberg 1988; Green, 
Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).  I find evidence of both stability and change among this 
sample of high-school seniors.  About 40% maintain their partisanship across the campaign, 
about 25% maintain their apolitical status across the campaign, but for the remainder, 
partisan identification shifts in some way across these few months.  These changes are not 
simply idiosyncratic – or merely whims for young people who have not yet thought about 
politics in a concrete way.  Undoubtedly, some of this observed instability in partisanship is 
based on inexperience or uncertainty.   But some of this change is substantive, such that 
factors like political personality and social context help explain why young people change their 
identification over the course of a midterm election.   
Studies of political socialization sometimes suggest that children have little role in 
choosing their own partisanship, as their partisan identity is seen the product of accepting 
parental partisanship or a reflection of the nature of a political era.  These results suggest that 
more attention should be paid to young people as actors in their own political socialization.  
Given the importance of partisanship to electoral politics and its centrality to so many political 
evaluations, it is normatively reassuring to see partisanship as something not just inherited, 
but developed with feedback and input from the child during adolescence.  Certainly, others 
have raised the idea that youth choices influence the development of partisanship (e.g. Achen 
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2002; Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008), but this study provides new evidence of 
how this might occur, as individuals’ propensity for partisan change rests in part on political 
personality.  Adolescents are not merely receipts of partisan lessons from parents, but active 
participants in their political socialization, responding to the character of the political 
environment they inhabit. 
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Appendix – Question Wordings 
 
Frequency of political talk with parents (pre-election and post-election) 
“How often do you talk about politics with your parents?   
1-Never, 2, 3, 4, 5-Frequently 
 
Frequency of political talk with friends (pre-election and post-election) 
“How often do you talk about politics with friends?   
1-Never, 2, 3, 4, 5-Frequently 
 
Frequency of political talk in school (post-election) 
“How often was the election campaign discussed in your classes?”   
1-Never, 2, 3, 4, 5-Frequently 
 
Frequency of political talk in religious groups (post-election) 
“How often is politics discusses in your church, synagogue, or temple?”   
1-Never, 2, 3, 4, 5-Often 
 
Attention to politics (pre-election and post-election) 
“How much attention do you pay to news about politics?”  
1-None, 2, 3, 4, 5-A great deal 
 
Political interest  (pre-election) 
“In general, how much interest do you have in politics?” 
1-None, 2, 3, 4, 5-A great deal 
 
Cognitive engagement with political news (pre-election) 
“When I hear news about politics, I try to figure out what is really going on.” 
Not like me, Somewhat like me, A lot like me 
 
Conflict avoidance 
“Discussions about politics sometimes make me feel uncomfortable.” 
Not like me, Somewhat like me, A lot like me 
 
Tendency to challenge parents (pre-election and post-election) 
“How often do you express a political opinion to challenge a parent?” 
“How often do you express an opinion to provoke some response from parents?” 
“How often do you express an opinion to see if it might upset your parents?” 
1-Never, 2, 3, 4, 5-Frequently 
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Table 1: Partisan identification, Pre-election versus Post-election   
  Partisanship, Pre-election  
    Democrat Republican Other party Not political Total 
Democrat 72% 6% 35% 14% 29% 
Republican 7% 74% 9% 9% 24% 
Other party 5% 1% 33% 7% 10% 
Partisanship, 
Post-election 
Not political 16% 18% 23% 70% 37% 
       




Table 2: Change in Partisanship, Pre-election to Post-election   
 
Any change in 
partisanship  
Direction of change in 
partisanship 
     No party 
Different 
party 
National party transfers to states 1.453*  3.267* 0.648 
 (0.541)  (0.886) (0.620) 
     
Senatorial campaign spending -0.144  -0.448* -0.012 
 (0.126)  (0.185) (0.149) 
     
Gubernatorial campaign spending 0.007  -0.516+ 0.197 
 (0.195)  (0.312) (0.226) 
     
Political interest -1.103*  -1.213+ -1.055* 
 (0.468)  (0.717) (0.538) 
     
Cognitive engagement with political news 0.798*  1.230* 0.579+ 
 (0.299)  (0.450) (0.348) 
     
Conflict avoidance -0.581*  -0.622 -0.601+ 
 (0.278)  (0.412) (0.321) 
     
Tendency to challenge parents, pre-election 0.797+  0.905 0.860 
 (0.468)  (0.747) (0.529) 
     
∆ in tendency to challenge parents 0.676  0.822 0.727 
 (0.454)  (0.715) (0.517) 
     
Attention to politics, pre-election 1.163+  0.562 1.484* 
 (0.621)  (0.940) (0.717) 
     
∆ in attention to politics -0.538  -1.937* 0.256 
 (0.481)  (0.755) (0.566) 
     
Frequency of political talk with parents, pre-election -0.144  -2.301* 0.660 
 (0.506)  (0.852) (0.582) 
     
∆ in frequency of political talk with parents 0.638  -1.366+ 1.438* 
 (0.450)  (0.751) (0.518) 
     
Frequency of political talk with friends, pre-election -0.405  -1.065 -0.288 
 (0.442)  (0.710) (0.505) 
     
∆ in frequency of political talk with friends -0.461  -0.940 -0.276 
 (0.398)  (0.626) (0.457) 
     
Frequency of political talk in school, post-election 0.594*  0.355 0.715* 
 (0.293)  (0.445) (0.343) 
     
Frequency of political talk in church, post-election -0.473  -1.085+ -0.145 
 (0.372)  (0.627) (0.419) 
     
Constant -1.329*  -0.855 -2.514* 
 (0.465)  (0.711) (0.548) 
     
N 570  569 
          
First column, multilevel logit estimates.  Other columns, multilevel multinomial logit estimates. 
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